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I. Introduction
Clara Campoamor (1925) argued that the problem for women was none 
other than that of being “forever judged by alien norms”. That is, by norms de-
veloped and, subsequently, applied and interpreted based on a normative model 
of human experience built from a standpoint that is alien to the experiences and 
lives of women. Clara Campoamor’s words are particularly relevant to our times 
if one considers that one of the key political, social, and, of course, legal debates 
in Spain today is one centred on the need to analyse, study, and review criminal 
offences relating to sexual freedom and indemnity.
The ruling of the Provincial Court of Navarre in the La Manada case (Provincial 
Court of Navarre ruling 38/20181 of 20 March) led to reflections from the gender 
perspective about the terms under which norms are applied in Spain, and more 
specifically about the terms under which types of criminal offences are applied 
and interpreted in the case of crimes against sexual freedom and indemnity. The 
evolution and historical (and therefore normative) scrutiny of these crimes have 
always gone hand in hand with feminist legal demands concerning women’s 
rights. In this regard, one must bear in mind that the definition of rape as a crime 
rather than a sexual act is a fairly recent development that came thanks to femi-
nist movements in the United States in the 1970s. Brownmiller (1975)2 points to 
one of the core aspects of these criminal offences—power. From this perspec-
tive, Brownmiller does not hesitate to stress that rape (and the threat thereof) is 
a form of maintaining the power of men—in general—over all women (and, by 
extension, minors). It is therefore not possible to make a sexual abstraction of 
the subjects affected, let alone the place and position that the victim and the 
perpetrator occupy in the sex/gender system. Statistical data are clear in this re-
gard. Hence the importance of thinking about the term rape (Vigarello, 1999)3 in 
line with the current definition of “sexual assault” in the Penal Code, the assess-
ment of which always depends—in specific cases—on the presence of violence 
and intimidation. In the sexual sphere, violence has been delimited and identified 
by case law as “physical force”, while intimidation is considered with reference 
to “mental force”, which is not always easy to prove in contexts involving clear 
socio/sexual asymmetry. In this respect, we must quote Herman’s (2015 [1992])4 
lamentation of how women have learned that rape has been (and continues to 
1 Ruling 38/2018, of 20 March, of the Provincial Court of Navarre in the La Manada case may be con-
sulted at http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/contenidos.action?action=contentpdf&databasematch=AN&
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be) a crime only in theory, since “(…) in practice the standard for what constitutes 
rape is set not at the level of women’s experience of violation but just above the 
level of coercion acceptable to men” (Herman, 1992; 72).
Perhaps the time is ripe to reverse this situation and to review the typology 
of criminal offences in light of the Draft Organic Law on the Comprehensive 
Guarantee of Sexual Freedom that is currently being debated in Spain, and to 
assess the terms under which they are being applied and interpreted. All of this 
must be done from the basis of a critical and constructive reflection that makes 
it possible to work towards equality, true to the tenets of anti-discrimination law.
II. Objectives
Catharine MacKinnon (1983) claimed5—in the 1970s and 1980s—that the 
law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women. This statement 
serves as the perfect preamble for introducing a series of questions that are key 
to this study and the answers to which make it possible to define its objectives, 
namely: 
–  (a) In what terms has legal discourse thought (and in what terms does it 
currently think) about women?
–  (b) Is legal discourse neutral?
–  (c) What could one say has been (and is) the normative model of human 
experience, and what has been the effect of the configuration of said mod-
el when giving content to norms that seek to prevent violence against 
women?
–  (d) What has been (and what is) the effect of said model when applying and 
interpreting norms?
–  (e) Under what terms and subject to what parameters has sexual violence 
been conceptually defined? As circumstantial and/or neutral violence? Or 
as instrumental and structural violence?
–  (f) Where has progress been made? What are the current challenges in the 
context of legal analysis? Are there risks of regression?
–  (g) What is the transformative potential of applying a gender perspective as 
a methodology of legal analysis when approaching sexual violence?
These concise questions serve as a common thread for conducting a nor-
mative review from the perspective of feminist legal theories (Smart, 19946; 
5 MAcKinnon (1983), pp. 635-658. 
6 sMArt (1994), pp. 167-177. 
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Facio, 20007; Picht, 20038; Jaramillo, 20099), in order to reflect on the way in 
which the law has thought (and thinks) about women regarding crimes against 
sexual freedom and indemnity. The fact remains that anyone who thinks also 
builds an imaginary, in this case a legal imaginary that constructs and outlines 
subjects of law (a normative model of human experience). Depending on the 
terms under which the law constructs subjects, one will be presented with either 
subjects whose rights are recognized or subjects to whom rights are conceded. 
To talk about and distinguish between “recognition” and “concession” of rights 
along these lines implies distinguishing and identifying different degrees of le-
gal and political subjectivity. It implies recognizing that there are autonomous 
subjects and heteronomous subjects, self-designated subjects (with the ability 
to reach agreements) and hetero-designated subjects (subjects agreed upon). 
The latter are subjects whose subjectivity is constructed based on the viewpoint 
of the Other, i.e., based on otherness, alterity, inessentiality, and/or periphery in 
relation to the normative model of human experience.
It goes without saying that these considerations have affected, and continue 
to affect, normative policies in addressing gender-based violence, and therefore 
sexual violence. As such, this article invites the reader to question the law in 
order to ascertain the role it currently plays: whether it be an uncritical role sus-
taining the sex/gender system under the paradigm of normative and/or formal 
equality; or, conversely, a transformative role based on the critique and refor-
mulation of legal categories within the framework of anti-discrimination law. It is 
based on these premises that we call for a review of the normative effectiveness 
of criminal offence typology in matters relating to sexual freedom and indemnity, 
as well as current proposals for their reform.
III. Normative review and feminist legal theories
Title VIII of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code classifies crimes against sexual 
freedom and indemnity in articles 178 to 194. For the purposes of this article, it 
is worth noting how these criminal offences traditionally fell under the category 
of “crimes against honesty”. This was the case up until the reform enacted by 
Organic Law 3/1989. Subsequently, and following the reform enacted by Or-
ganic Law 11/1999, they came to be defined as crimes against sexual freedom 
7 FAcio (2000), pp. 15-44. 
8 Pitch (2003).
9 JArAMillo (2009), pp. 103-133. 
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and indemnity (Goenaga, 1997)10. The protected legal right is clearly that of sex-
ual freedom, which carries with it an implicit recognition of personal autonomy, 
which in this specific case pertains to the sphere of sexual corporeality. The 
scientific doctrine has come to coin it as “self-determination or free disposition 
of sexual potentiality and the right not to be involved in a sexual act without 
consent”. Following on from the above, the protected legal right in the case of 
minors is not that of sexual freedom but of sexual intangibility and indemnity.
With regard to the protected legal right in the criminal offences mentioned, it 
is important to quote ruling no. 252/2008 of 20 October of the Provincial Court 
of Barcelona (Section 9), which makes it clear that what is being protected is not 
honesty but sexual freedom. Concerning sexual freedom, the Supreme Court 
ruling of 6 November 1992 states:
“(…) Every human person, regardless of their activity or condi-
tion, has the inalienable right to decide on their sexuality. As the sci-
entific doctrine has rightly stated, the protected legal right is sexual 
freedom in its dual facets of self-determination or free disposition 
of sexual potentiality and the right not to be involved in a sexual act 
without consent”. 
Similarly, it is worth highlighting the Supreme Court ruling of 18 October 
1993, which provides that:
“(…) Sexual freedom is violated, infringed, and undermined 
because the will of the violated, injured, and assaulted person is 
ignored, thus leading to an understanding, in a unity of concepts, 
of will as a synonym of freedom. This sexual freedom, which per-
haps upholds the most important facet of human nature, allows 
a person, man or woman, to develop their sexual desires to the 
extent that they wish, and however they may wish to do so, in line 
with their wants and to the extent that their partner naturally allows 
them, by means of the consent that must govern these relations, 
within the most absolute equality of the sexes”. 
Evidently, the recognition of sexual freedom as a protected legal right was 
a turning point in the legal and political subjectivity of women. This situation has 
nevertheless not succeeded in deploying its full normative effectiveness in terms 
of the protection of women’s rights, as illustrated by ruling no. 38/2018 of the 
10 goenAgA (1997), pp. 95-120. 
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Second Section of the Provincial Court of Navarre of 20 March. The trial court’s 
classification of the proven facts as sexual abuse rather than sexual assault laid 
bare the prevailing androcentrism in law with regard to the “non-recognition” (or 
partial recognition) of women’s rights in the socio/sexual sphere.
The situation described—regarding the legal approach to sexual violence—
is not new, as it has been denounced for years by feminist legal critics within 
the framework of so-called anti-discrimination law. Hence the need to take into 
account the gender perspective among the criteria of normative application and 
interpretation (Torres, 201711 and 201812), in keeping with the rest of the criteria 
set out in article 313 of the Civil Code, along with those specifically relating to 
fundamental rights. The reason for this is not insignificant if one considers the 
terms under which the legal discourse has traditionally thought about women.
The reading of the ruling of the Provincial Court of Navarre in the La Manada 
case is a clear example of the perpetuation of an aged legal discourse in which 
everything revolves around a (falsely abstract) central subject that is neither neu-
tral nor remains detached from the socio/sexual construction of reality. Evidence 
of this may be found in how the proven facts were subsumed under the type 
of criminal offence according to the legal classification of the facts. This is be-
cause—crucially—the victim’s credibility was not under discussion (other than 
the dissenting opinion). And all of this came after having followed a process with 
full procedural and constitutional guarantees under a social and democratic rule 
of law. 
Reference was made above to the terms under which the law—in gener-
al—has thought about women. This thinking has been expressed around a legal 
subjectivity materialized in a sexual and reproductive corporeality that has been 
alien to women, since it has been built from the dominant position of the nor-
mative subject of human (male) experience. In this respect, one must consider 
the poor recognition of women’s sexual and reproductive rights in Spain, still 
at the expense of the Constitutional Court’s ruling. Or consider the attempts to 
regulate surrogacy (Torres, 2020)14 and the proposals to regulate and/or legalize 
prostitution (Torres, 2020)15. Note how in all these cases the object of regulation 
is women’s bodies—that is, what may or may not be done with them and/or 
11 torres DíAz (2017), pp. 181-214. 
12 torres DíAz (2018).
13 Article 3 of the Spanish Civil Code provides that: “1. Rules shall be construed according to the proper 
meaning of their wording and in connection with the context, with their historical and legislative background 
and with the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, mainly attending to their spirit and 
purpose. 2. Equity must be taken into account in applying rules, but the resolutions of the Courts may only 
be based exclusively on equity when the law expressly allows this”. 
14 torres DíAz (2020).
15 torres DíAz (2020), pp. 121-148. 
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what may or may not be acceptable and/or legitimate in this regard. The same 
remarks may be extrapolated—albeit with some caveats from the perspective of 
the subjective scope of application—to the penal sphere with respect to crimes 
against sexual freedom and indemnity. 
Returning to the topic of sexual violence, below is a summary of the terms 
under which criminal protection has taken shape when faced with crimes against 
sexual freedom and indemnity: 
1. With regard to the crime of sexual assault, it is worth noting 
that what is relevant for the purposes of this article is the require-
ment of violence or intimidation in the case of a basic offence, as 
well as vaginal, anal, or oral penetration in the case of an aggravat-
ed offence. From a gender perspective, it is worth seriously reflect-
ing on the terms under which the current legal language continues 
to define violence or intimidation. The fact remains that the socio/
sexual asymmetry of the sex/gender system obliges us to position 
ourselves in the place of women—particularly in contexts of a sex-
ual nature, where the subordination and objectification of women is 
patent and manifest. In this regard, what is needed is a broadening 
of viewpoints in order to conceptualize situations of environmental 
sexual violence. 
2. With regard to the crime of sexual abuse, anyone who, with-
out violence or intimidation and without consent, performs acts 
that violate the sexual freedom or indemnity of another person is 
found guilty of sexual abuse. Feminist legal critics have questioned 
the non-acknowledgement of violence or intimidation in contexts 
without consent. In this respect, one must bear in mind that sexual 
consent (and its legal expression), in the case of crimes against 
sexual freedom and indemnity, transfers responsibility to women 
when it comes to establishing limits on men’s sexual insistence 
(Oxman, 2015)16. From this lens, it is women who bear the burden 
of proof regarding their refusal of unwanted sexual advances.
3. We observe that the defining and differentiating element be-
tween sexual assault and sexual abuse in our legal system is that of 
violence or intimidation. This “violence” replaces the requirement of 
“force” in the previous regulation, which was expressed in contrast 
to the requirement of resistance by the victim, and which allowed 
many cases of suspected sexual assault to go unpunished, since 
16 oxMAn (2015), pp. 92-118. 
120 VOLUME IV \ n.º 3 \ novembro 2020 \ 113-130
DOUTRINA
they could not be proven. Concerning “intimidation”, it is worth 
highlighting the ability to instil fear and/or dread in the victim, which 
has a direct impact on the free exercise of individuality and the 
free development of personality in sexual matters. With regard to 
“abuse with undue influence”, it is worth pointing out that it has its 
origins in behaviours aimed at obtaining sexual favours through vi-
tiated consent derived from a position of superiority. In this respect, 
it is worth mentioning the critical voices that call into question the 
place of undue influence within the sexual abuse offence, since it 
prevents many behaviours from being classified as sexual assault.
Focusing our analysis on the ruling of the Provincial Court of Navarre of 20 
March 2018, the following aspects merit attention:
1. Firstly, the absence of a gender perspective in the ruling in 
question—in other words, the failure of the court to position itself in 
the place of the victim when analysing the situation and the context 
in which the proven facts took place; a context of clear socio/sex-
ual asymmetry that implies violence and intimidation.
2. Secondly, the need to initiate a legal debate on a possible 
penal reform with regard to crimes classified under Title VIII of Book 
II of the Penal Code from a gender perspective. In this regard, it is 
necessary to analyse quantitative data on who are usually the pas-
sive subjects in this type of crime (women and minors), as opposed 
to the active subjects (men).
3. Thirdly, the need for a rewording of the crime of sexual as-
sault, in keeping with the terms of the Istanbul Convention, which 
has been mandatory in our legal system since August 2014. This 
body of law defines sexual assault (rape) in the following terms: 
“Any non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of the body 
of another person where the penetration is of a sexual nature, with 
any bodily part or with an object”. 
IV. Sexual violence and the new conceptualization of sexual 
assault
On 4 July 2019, the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court ruled on the ap-
peal for judicial review no. 396/2019 in the case known as La Manada. Supreme 
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Court ruling 344/2019, of 4 July, represents an important step in the conceptual 
delimitation of crimes against sexual freedom and indemnity, demonstrating the 
transformative capacity of gender as a category of legal analysis and a bastion 
for revealing the socio/sexual power structure implicit in legal discourse, becom-
ing key in categorizing the gender perspective as a methodology to be followed 
in the court’s legal praxis. The High Court’s assessment that there had indeed 
been intimidation and violence was key for classifying the proven facts as rape 
and not as mere sexual abuse. Likewise, it made it possible to shift the atten-
tion towards the behaviour of the aggressors rather than the victim’s reaction or 
whether or not there was consent. The High Court’s ruling marks a “before and 
after” moment and outlines the terms for a future reform of the relevant criminal 
offence typology. 
The most significant aspects are listed below: 
1. The High Court classifies the proven facts as “rape”. To be 
exact, it speaks of a “continued crime of rape”. It therefore uses the 
term “rape” rather than “sexual assault”, which helps to create a 
critical symbolic imaginary of reproach that goes beyond the mere-
ly criminal (and hence legal) sphere. As such, what it says and how 
it is said in the ruling will be key in giving women a central place 
in the protection of their rights when confronted with this type of 
crime. Moreover, the Supreme Court applies two specific aggravat-
ing factors, namely: (a) humiliating and degrading treatment of the 
victim and (b) joint action by two or more persons. 
2. The Supreme Court speaks of an incorrect application of 
criminal offence typology in the previous rulings (ruling of the Pro-
vincial Court of Navarre, 26 April 2018; and ruling of the Superior 
Court of Justice of Navarre, Civil and Criminal Division, 30 Novem-
ber 2018). But, what is more, with a certain air of reproach, it hints 
at their incomprehensible failure to observe their own doctrine on 
the matter by not acknowledging the intimidation requirement. Let 
us recall that the Superior Court of Justice of Navarra had stated 
“(…) that the proven facts of the Court’s ruling (…) do not include 
the indispensable action of intimidation or threat on the part of the 
defendants, whether express or tacit”. 
3. The High Court crucially indicates how, based on the factual 
account contained in the first instance ruling, “(…) a truly intimidat-
ing scenario is described”—a scenario in which “(…) the victim at 
no time consents to the sexual acts carried out by the accused”. 
This reference to an “intimidating scenario” is crucial for the High 
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Court in expressing the maximum criminal sanction in its contextu-
al analysis. Indeed, it describes how the given situation caused the 
victim to “(…) adopt an attitude of submission (…) faced with the 
anguish and intense stress that the situation produced in her, giv-
en the hidden, narrow, and dead-end location into which she was 
forcibly introduced, as well as the personal circumstances of the 
victim and the accused”. The High Court does not stop there, but 
specifies the terms under which these circumstances “were taken 
advantage of” by those sentenced “in order to perform the acts 
against her freedom”. It further specifies: “(…) at least 10 sexual 
assaults involving oral, vaginal, and anal penetration”. 
4. The Supreme Court is forceful and specifies that the error of 
legal classification of the first instance ruling is not solely and exclu-
sively limited to having established sexual abuse rather than sexual 
assault, but further that it failed to consider the fact that there was 
not just one continuous crime of rape, but rather a number of sex-
ual assault offences by perpetrators and participants.
The briefly outlined Supreme Court ruling brought about a change and/or 
materialization in normative interpretation and application, for the sake of le-
gal security in the face of crimes against sexual freedom and indemnity. In this 
regard, intimidation—as a key component to be considered—is no longer as-
sessed based on the “legal neutrality” of the aggressors’ position of socio/sexual 
power, and is instead assessed based on the asymmetry in which women are 
placed by the sex/gender system in contexts of a sexual nature. This is undoubt-
edly an important step forward in light of the recent introduction of the Draft 
Organic Law on the Comprehensive Guarantee of Sexual Freedom17.
The following section focuses on the analysis of the most significant de-
velopments that the Draft Law incorporates in terms of the legal approach to 
crimes against sexual freedom and indemnity:
1. The Draft Law proposes to repeal the crime category of sex-
ual abuse, such that any act against sexual freedom and indemnity 
falls under the crime of sexual assault (First Final Provision, section 
8 of the Draft Law).
17 The Council of Ministers of 3 March 2020 approved the Draft Organic Law for the Guarantee of Sex-
ual Freedom. Available at: https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/Paginas/2020/
refc20200303.aspx (date consulted: 20/06/2020). 
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•  The proposed new wording for article 178 of the Penal Code 
is as follows:
“1.  Anyone who performs any act that violates the sexual free-
dom of another person without his or her consent shall 
be punished with a prison term of one to four years for 
sexual assault. It shall be understood that there is no con-
sent when the victim has not freely expressed, by means 
of overt, conclusive, and unequivocal acts in accordance 
with the attendant circumstances, his or her express will to 
participate in the act.
2.  For the purposes of the preceding section, sexual assault 
shall be deemed to consist of such acts of a sexual content 
that are performed with the use of violence, intimidation, or 
abuse of a situation of superiority or vulnerability of the vic-
tim, as well as those committed against persons who have 
been rendered unconscious or whose mental condition has 
been taken advantage of, and those performed when the 
victim has been deprived of his or her will for whatever rea-
son.
3.  The Judge or Court may, in the grounds for their ruling, and 
provided that the circumstances set out in article 180 do not 
apply, impose the lesser prison term or a fine of eighteen to 
twenty-four months, in consideration of the lesser nature of 
the incident”.
2. The Draft Law decreases prison terms for basic sexual as-
sault offences, as set out in the literal wording of First Final Pro-
vision, section 8. In this respect, a penalty of one to four years is 
proposed, compared to one to five years in the current wording in 
the Penal Code.
3. A specific aggravating factor related to marital or emotional 
ties is created (First Final Provision of the Draft Law). The proposed 
new wording of article 180 would be as follows: 
“1.  The above behaviours shall be punished with a prison term 
of two to six years for the aggressions established in art. 
178.1, and of seven to twelve years for those established 
in art. 179 when any of the following circumstances apply: 
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(…) 4. When the victim is or has been a wife of the offend-
er or is a woman who is or has been associated with the 
offender in an analogous relationship of intimacy, with or 
without cohabitation (…)”.
4. Articles 19 to 27 of Title III of the Draft Law include pro-
fessional training and specialization as a guarantee for specialized 
treatment. The wording of article 19, paragraph 1, is as follows:
“1.  Professional specialization shall be guaranteed through 
compulsory initial training and ongoing training, which all 
professional sectors involved in the prevention of sexual vi-
olence and in the response thereto must receive (…)”.
5. Special attention ought to be paid to articles 22 (training 
for Security Forces and Bodies), 23 (training in judicial and pros-
ecutorial professions, and of court clerks in the Administration of 
Justice), 2418 (training in the field of legal practice), and 2519 (train-
ing in the forensic field). With regard to training in the judicial and 
prosecutorial professions, the instruction provides that:
“1.  The Ministry of Justice and the General Council of the Judi-
ciary shall adopt the necessary measures to guarantee the 
inclusion, as part of the curriculum for access to the judi-
cial and prosecutorial professions, as well as that of court 
clerks in the Administration of Justice, of topics devoted to 
equality and non-discrimination based on gender, and in 
18 The literal wording of article 24 of the draft law is as follows: “1. Public Administrations, in collaboration 
with Bar Associations, shall promote the adequate training of legal professionals responsible for assisting 
victims of sexual violence. 2. Bar Associations, when they require specialization courses for work as a pub-
lic defender, shall include a specific line of training on sexual violence as part of the subject of gender-based 
violence”.
19 Article 25 sets out: “1. Public Administrations, within the scope of their respective competences, shall 
ensure that Forensic Medicine Institutes, as part of the initial and ongoing training of the multidisciplinary 
teams of professionals belonging to comprehensive forensic assessment units, include the gender per-
spective, as well as training to identify sexual violence (…)”. 
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particular the comprehensive protection against all forms of 
sexual violence.
2.  The Ministry of Justice and the General Council of the Ju-
diciary shall ensure the inclusion, as part of the initial and 
ongoing training of members of the Judicial Profession, the 
Prosecution Ministry, and other bodies in the service of the 
Administration of Justice, of topics devoted to a gender per-
spective (…)”.
Without ignoring other developments of interest for the present article, spe-
cial attention should be paid to the requirement of express, free, and unequiv-
ocal consent in the definition of the crime of sexual assault, as featured in the 
new wording of article 178 of the Penal Code. Regarding consent, the proposed 
wording of article 178 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
• “(…) It shall be understood that there is no consent when the 
victim has not freely expressed, by means of overt, conclusive, and 
unequivocal acts in accordance with the attendant circumstances, 
his or her express will to participate in the act”.
The definition of “sexual consent” in the above terms has sparked a legal de-
bate, on account—not solely—of the difficulties it may bring in evidentiary mat-
ters. The fact is that for behaviour to be classed as an offence, it must be proven 
that consent was not free, express, and unequivocal. The legal debate around 
sexual consent arises in different domains, essentially because no definition of 
sexual consent exists, and therefore it is up to the courts to ultimately establish 
whether there was consent or not. In this respect, it is worth remembering that 
the current wording of the Penal Code implies that any sexual contact without 
consent already amounts to a criminal offence. The issue arises in the legal prax-
is of the court when this type of situation occurs in contexts where the victim’s 
statement is the sole incriminating evidence to disprove the presumption of inno-
cence of the accused. As a result, case law criteria will need to be observed and 
applied for the statement of the victim/witness to have sufficient incriminating 
capacity for the purposes of obtaining a conviction (Supreme Court rulings of 5 
December 2013 and 6 March 2019), namely:
1. Absence of subjective disbelief.
2. Plausibility of testimonial evidence.
3. Persistent incrimination.
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For the sake of completeness, and with regard to the position of the victim/
witness in the criminal proceedings, it will be necessary to comply with the pro-
visions of the latest case law of the High Court, where a gender perspective is 
applied as a methodology of legal analysis, insofar as it has been made clear 
that the victim/witness in contexts of gender-based violence must be considered 
a qualified witness of the aggressions suffered. This circumstance has a clear 
practical dimension, in that it makes it possible to grant greater probative value 
to their testimony, as opposed to that of a mere external witness. Legal grounds 
2 of Supreme Court ruling 2182/2018, Criminal Division, 13 June 2018, states 
the following:
• “(…) It must be made clear that in this case, victims of acts 
of gender-based violence testify in court from a different position 
to witnesses who saw the incident (…). In these cases, the victim 
procedurally has the status of a witness, but unlike the rest of the 
witnesses, he or she is a victim, and this ought to have a certain 
distinguishing bearing on the means of evidence, since positioning 
the victim within the category of a mere witness denatures the true 
position of the victim in the criminal proceedings, given that he or 
she is not simply someone who ‘saw’ an incident and can testify 
about it, but is the passive subject of the crime, and due to his or 
her probative categorization, must be given more weight than the 
mere unrelated and external witness to the incident (…)”. 
Notwithstanding the above, the proposed reform has given rise to conflicting 
positions and legal doubts concerning the message that has been conveyed 
to the public under the slogan “solo sí es sí” (only yes means yes) in the socio/
sexual sphere. For those who oppose the reform, these doubts could under-
mine the right to the presumption of innocence and, therefore, effective judicial 
protection by passing the burden of proof to the accused, thus perverting the 
logic of criminal proceedings by establishing a iuris tamtum presumption of guilt 
of the accused—in other words, what the scientific doctrine has come to refer 
to as probatio diabolica of negative facts (ruling 140/1991 of the Constitutional 
Court, 20 June20, among others). Naturally, all of these aspects will need to be 
legally assessed and considered from a clear gender perspective, so as not 
20 The Spanish Constitutional Court provides the following in ruling 140/1991: “Among this content of 
the fundamental right, it is presently worth highlighting the requirement of a sufficient body of evidence, with 
the acting Public Administration having the burden of proof for both the committing of the illicit act and the 
participation of the accused, without the latter being required to provide a probatio diabolica of negative 
facts”. 
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to distort the core legal principles at work in the procedural-penal sphere, but 
without overlooking the difficulties faced by the victims of these types of crimes 
and the insufficiencies of their current legal treatment, which has shown itself to 
be incapable of laying bare the socio/sexual power structures in contexts of a 
sexual nature.
The foregoing explains why certain sectors may have focused their propos-
als for reform on the removal of the crime category of sexual abuse and on the 
requirement of explicit consent, so that where there is no explicit consent, there 
is a crime of sexual assault. In turn, the proposals also make reference to the ef-
fects of vitiated consent, with consent being considered non-existent if there are 
peripheral elements that prove that it was granted under coercion. In a similar 
vein, there has been an emphasis on the recognition of “environmental intimida-
tion” to prove that no consent was given, and on banning any evidence in court 
regarding the victim’s sexual history. 
These are no doubt significant challenges that must be approached based 
on a gender-sensitive analysis that is able to position itself in the place of the 
victim and the perpetrator, in order to identify the asymmetries of socio/sexual 
power that operate in this domain.
V. Due diligence and the right to full reparation
Two of the aforementioned Draft Law’s innovations deserve special atten-
tion, namely:
1. Reference to due diligence.
2. Recognition of victims’ right to full reparation.
Regarding due diligence and state accountability, the Draft Law rightly cites 
Recommendation 35 (2017) of the CEDAW Committee on gender-based vio-
lence against women, which sets out the scope of the obligations of states 
regarding all forms of violence against women committed by state agents or 
private individuals, including sexual violence, declaring that these must include 
the obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible 
and ensure reparation for victims. In turn, article 2, section 2 of the Draft Law 
makes express reference to this, establishing it as a guiding principle for action 
in the following terms:
• “Due diligence. The response to sexual violence shall extend 
to all spheres of institutional accountability, such as prevention, 
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protection, assistance, reparation for victims, and the pursuit of 
justice, and shall be aimed at guaranteeing the recognition and 
effective exercise of rights”.
The projection of due diligence in the aforementioned normative text is 
found, for instance, in the expression of the right to specialized comprehensive 
assistance, in the right to information and comprehensive support, in the guar-
antee of access to justice, and in the guarantee of providing training to all legal 
(and non-legal) agents whose activities belong to this domain.
On the concept of due diligence, see the recent Spanish Constitutional Court 
ruling 87/2020 of 20 July 2020, where the highest constitutional interpreter alludes 
to the positive obligation of the States to act and guarantee fundamental rights.
Concerning the right to full reparation, the Explanatory Statement of the 
Draft Law establishes it as a fundamental right in the context of state obligations 
with regard to human rights. Article 49 of the aforementioned legal text sets this 
out as follows:
• “Women victims of gender-based violence have the right to 
reparation, which includes monetary compensation for damages 
and losses resulting from the violence, the necessary measures for 
their full physical, mental, and social recovery, actions of symbolic 
reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition (…)”. 
As for the content of the right to full reparation, it is worth mentioning the 
right to compensation for damages and losses suffered (physical, mental, moral, 
loss of opportunities, material damage, loss of income, therapeutic and medical 
treatments, etc.). In the same vein, it refers to the guarantee of full physical, 
mental, and social recovery, which must be observed by the Public Administra-
tion, as well as effective protection against any retaliation or threats, which shall 
require the promotion of specific programmes aimed at persons convicted of 
crimes against sexual freedom.
V. Final considerations
The legal debate on sexual violence is a reality in Spain, as shown by reac-
tions in the legal (and social) sphere to recent high-profile cases of group rape. 
Examples include the La Manada de los Sanfermines case, the La Manada de 
Manresa case, and the Arandina group rape case. It is in this context that the 
Organic Law on the Comprehensive Guarantee of Sexual Freedom was born. It 
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seeks to bring together the demands of feminist legal collectives and the latest 
case law of the Supreme Court mentioned earlier in this article and materialized 
in the Supreme Court ruling no. 344/2019 of 4 July. The legal approach to the 
matter is complex and, in any event, must start from a critical reflection on the 
legal construction of subjects of law (De Cabo, 2010)21 based on a critique of the 
legal dogma on women’s sexual corporeality and its implications in contexts of a 
sexual nature, in relation to which the Penal Code has evolved in the delimitation 
of crimes against sexual freedom and indemnity. This evolution may be traced 
back to when we stopped talking about “honesty” as the protected legal right 
and began to talk instead about “sexual freedom”. In order to be full and effec-
tive, sexual freedom requires the prior recognition of the sexual and reproductive 
autonomy (Torres, 2014) of women as full legal/political subjects. On the basis 
of these approaches, the legal debates underway must come together around 
a series of parameters: 
• (a) The comprehensive questioning of the theoretical and 
conceptual framework from which legal discourse has constructed 
women (and men), in order to identify the prevailing socio/sexual 
power structures and their effects in the penal sphere and, more 
specifically, in terms of crimes against sexual freedom and indemnity.
• (b) A critical reflection on the legal discourses formed around 
women’s bodies as body-objects (instead of subjects) for the sat-
isfaction of the needs of others in the sexual and reproductive 
sphere.
• (c) The recognition of women’s sexual corporeality and its 
implications in any relational sphere, which brings with it a con-
stitutional recognition of the sexuation of the subjects of law and, 
therefore, an express recognition of women’s bodily autonomy (the 
right to one’s own body) in the sexual and reproductive sphere.
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